Towards A Theoretical Framework for Social Impact Bonds by Albertson, Kevin et al.
Albertson, Kevin and Fox, Christopher and O’Leary, Christopher and Painter,
Gary (2020) Towards A Theoretical Framework for Social Impact Bonds.





Usage rights: Creative Commons: Attribution 4.0




Towards A Theoretical Framework for 
Social Impact Bonds 
 
Forthcoming in Nonprofit Policy Forum https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/npf?lang=en 
 
Kevin Albertson, Manchester Metropolitan University 
Chris Fox, Manchester Metropolitan University 
Chris O’Leary, Manchester Metropolitan University 
Gary Painter, University of Southern California 
Corresponding author:  
Chris Fox: c.fox@mmu.ac.uk 
Key words 
Social Impact Bonds, New Public Management, New Public Governance, Open Innovation, 
Social Innovation 
Abstract 
Governments in some of the world’s richest nations appear to be caught in a double challenge 
of declining social budgets even as social needs are increasing. In this context Outcomes 
Based Commissioning (OBC), has been suggested as one way in which ‘more’ social services 
can be provided for ‘less’ public resources. These forms of commissioning are often linked 
with a new financing tool for social services, referred to in the US as ‘Pay for Success and 
Payment by Results in the UK or as a ‘Social Impact Bond’ (SIB). However, to date, this 
approach is under-theorised and this is a limiting factor both for shaping a research and 
evaluation agenda around SIBs and in understanding how such instruments might develop in 
future. Without a theoretical rationale for SIBs, it is not straightforward to assess whether and 
how well they have achieved their goals and how they might be developed further. 
In this paper we consider two broad approaches to theorising SIBs. One draws on public 
administration theories, the other on innovation theories. To date, SIBs have often been 
theorised as the logical next step in the New Public Management (NPM). But NPM itself is a 
contested theory and recent theoretical innovations in public administration, particularly the 
concept of New Public Governance might provide a more useful theoretical framework. A 
second broad approach through which to understand SIBs is their potential to improve the 
rate and dissemination of innovation. There are many different innovation models that might 
be applied to better understanding SIBs. We look first at the concept of Open Innovation with 
its focus on distributed innovation processes in which knowledge flows across organisational 
boundaries and more recent articulations – Open Innovation 2.0 – which place greater 
emphasis on mixed economy collaborations involving: industry; government; universities; 
and communities and users (the so-called ‘quadruple helix’) to solve societal challenges. We 
go on to consider social innovation, with its clearer focus on using social means to deliver 
social outcomes and whether SIBs can be theorised through this lens. No model is entirely 
satisfactory as an explanatory framework for SIBs and we conclude by suggesting that a 
supporting theory combining NPG with elements of Open Innovation 2.0 and social 
innovation might be a productive approach for shaping future research and, in addition, might 
suggest some future directions for the next generation of SIBs.   
1. Introduction  
Governments in some of the world’s richest nations appear to be caught in a double 
challenge; they are faced with democratic demands to respond to increasing and some new 
social needs that include reducing re-offending, supporting young people into education and 
employment, loneliness, homelessness and reducing offending and drug use. Recently, 
however, many developed economies are undergoing a period of low-growth, if not economic 
contraction in real per-capita terms (see Kubiszewski et al. 2013; NEF 2004; Lawn 2003; and 
Cowen 2011). If improvements in public wellbeing are to be achieved, they must result from 
policies designed to deliver social output more effectively for less resources: ‘more for less’ 
as (former Prime Minister of the UK) David Cameron (2009) has put it. In this context 
Outcomes Based Commissioning (OBC), for example Pay for Success in the US or Payment 
by Results in the UK (Albertson et al. 2018), has been suggested as one way in which ‘more’ 
social services can be provided for ‘less’ public resources. These forms of commissioning are 
sometimes linked with a new financing tool for social services, referred to in the US as ‘Pay 
for Success Financing’, and elsewhere, particularly in the UK, as a Social Impact Bond (SIB). 
It is this financing tool, which we refer to as a SIB hereinafter, which is the focus of this 
paper. 
In the first instance, we might note that SIBs are rather misnamed (c.f. Wooldridge et al. 
2019). SIBs are not strictly speaking bonds (debt instruments), but rather are a class of OBC 
contract where the finance needed to make the contract work comes, not from government or 
the service provider, but from third-party investors, although in the UK this investment is 
often subsidised by central government SIB capacity building funds. In this sense SIB funded 
provision of public services is analogous to the UK’s Private Finance Initiative (PFI) funded 
provision of public infrastructure. However, early proponents distinguished SIBs from other 
forms of outcome-based payment by emphasising: their alignment of social and financial 
returns on investment; that service provider costs are covered by investors’ up-front – in 
theory minimising risk transfer to smaller, third sector providers –; and the potential for SIBs 
to bring together groups of social investors and portfolios of interventions (Social Finance 
2009). 
However, to date, it is not clear the potential of SIBs to facilitate social innovation has been 
realised – nor that it may be realised (Arena et al., 2016). It is not altogether clear what are 
SIBs and what their use is intended to achieve (Wooldridge et al. 2019). Furthermore, as we 
discuss below, while superficially similar, the UK approach and the US approach have very 
different emphases. The potential exists for the development of best (or at least better) 
practice if we develop an unifying structure within which they can both be framed. 
In short, SIBs are under-theorised and this is a limiting factor both for shaping a research and 
evaluation agenda around SIBs and in understanding how such instruments might develop in 
future. Unless we are clear what it is SIBs are designed to achieve, other than in general 
terms, it is not straightforward to assess whether they have achieved their potential and, if 
not, how we might progress. 
In this paper we consider two broad approaches to theorising SIBs. In the next section we 
draw on public administration theories, first New Public Management and then New Public 
Governance. In the third section we consider SIBs as a form of innovation, specifically Open 
Innovation and Social Innovation. Neither approach is entirely satisfactory as an explanatory 
framework for SIBs and in the final concluding section we suggest that combining New 
Public Governance with Open Innovation 2.0, which in turn incorporates the concept of 
social innovation, might be productive for shaping future research and suggesting some 
future directions for the next generation of SIBs.   
2. SIBs and public administration 
At first glance, the SIB approach appears attractive for public administrators; proponents 
argue it only pays for social outcomes where appropriate evaluation indicates there were 
sufficient monetised public benefits to cover the cost. Further, it supposedly provides an 
opportunity for investors to support mission-related projects with potential financial returns. 
Much early theoretical work on SIBs relates to the UK. This tends towards a focus on 
commissioning and has tended to draw on the public administration literature, in particular 
New Public Management.   
New Public Management  
Perhaps the most common theoretical explanation of the emergence and use of SIBs (and, 
more broadly, models of OBC) has been to understand them as part of the New Public 
Management (NPM) paradigm. NPM is a broad, almost ubiquitous, term that has been 
applied to a wide set of public sector reforms in a number of countries over the past four 
decades, although it includes a widely accepted set of characteristics accepted by most 
commentators Gruening (2001). Hood (1991) identified seven components to these reforms, 
which in general seek to apply the incentive structures developed by business to the provision 
of public goods and services. These have subsequently been summarised by Ferlie (2017) as 
the 3Ms: ‘markets’; ‘management’; and ‘measurement’.  
Several commentators (e.g. Sinclair et al. 2014, Dowling and Harvie 2014, Dowling 2017) 
view the SIB approach to delivering public services as informed by, or an extension of, New 
Public Management. SIBs explicitly involve two of the three Ms, namely markets and 
measurement; and implicitly promote innovation in the third M, management. In the UK, 
SIBs result from public sector commissioning, and hence arise from marketisation of public 
services. Indeed, for McHugh et al. (2013), in the UK SIBs are part of a much broader 
realignment of the relationship between the market and the state along the lines of 
marketisation or neo-liberalism (Berndt and Wirth 2018). In the UK, therefore, SIBs are 
theorised as a top down attempt to increase private sector involvement in the provision of 
previously publicly funded services. Measurement, is also (in theory at least) an integral part 
of a SIB contract (Rangan and Chase 2015); notwithstanding, in practice the evidence base 
on the effectiveness of SIBs is limited (Edmiston and Nicholls 2017).  
It might seem reasonable, therefore to theorise SIBs (in the UK at least) as part of a ‘public 
sector reform’ narrative that is an intrinsic part of NPM (Fraser et al. 2016). In particular, 
SIBs are often theorised as part of a move towards outcomes based contracting and payment 
for performance in public services more generally (Lagarde et al. 2013; Painter et al. 2018; 
Warner 2013) within the NPM framework. The public sector move towards market based 
measurement in the provision of social innovation is matched, to a greater or lesser extent, by 
the increasing use by third sector agencies of marketised norms, for example, Social Impact 
Reporting (Morley 2015). 
However, NPM does not seem to provide a sufficient theoretical framework for explaining 
SIBs. First, while superficially SIBs mirror some key themes in NPM such as purchaser-
provider splits  and incentivisation (Dunleavy et al. 2006) and contracting out and an 
emphasis on accountability for performance (Gruening 2001), in practice SIBs actually fall 
short of implementing the full logic of the tenets of NPM. The name itself is illustrative: 
While ‘Bond’ implies the whole-hearted take-up of private sector thinking on financing, 
Social Impact Bonds are not Bonds in the sense that a trader in a bond market would 
understand. Indeed Wooldridge et al. (2019) have argued the concept of the SIB might be 
better served with a different name. 
The concept of investor(s) in SIBs is also illustrative. Empirical evidence on SIBs, 
particularly those in the UK, suggests that the majority of investors are not-for-profit 
organisations (Albertson et al. 2018). To date, these have usually been either social investors 
– investors who consider both social and financial returns – or central or local government 
(Ronicle et al. 2014). More recent SIBs, especially those in the US, have at least one private 
investor, but the majority of programs still include a philanthropic or public investor. 
Secondly, while the SIB agenda in the UK might have often been driven by central 
government, with various funds to support the development and financing of SIBs launched 
by central government departments (Albertson et al. 2018), the originators of SIBs (PfS 
Financing) in the US are much more diverse and include third sector organisations seeking to 
expand their access to funding. This model does not fit well into the NPM framework. In the 
US, SIBs are closer to the private financial sector reform narrative identified by Fraser et al. 
(2018) which they see as very different to NPM and class as a social 
entrepreneurship/corporate social responsibility approach.  
New Public Governance 
Osborne (2006) argues that the NPM paradigm has been superceded by New Public 
Governance (NPG). This recognises the increasingly fragmented and uncertain nature of 
public management in the twenty-first century and assumes both a plural state (where 
multiple inter-dependent actors from the public, not-for-profit and private sector contribute to 
the delivery of public services) and a pluralist state (where power is distributed and multiple 
processes inform the policy making system). Where NPM is pre-occupied with linear and 
Fordist models of public service delivery, selectively drawn from the manufacturing and 
production literature, the focus of NPG is on inter-organisational relationships and the 
governance of processes, and it stresses service effectiveness and outcomes (Osborne 2006).  
The NPG perspective emphasises the design and evaluation of enduring inter-organisational 
relationships, where trust, relational capital and relational contracts act as the core 
governance mechanisms. Its value base is not in the efficacy of competition and markets, but 
instead is ‘neo-corporatist’ (based in assumptions of consensus, involving centralised and 
structured approaches, where government, labour interests and employer interests are 
organised to deliver policy). For Osborne (2006) this allows NPG to tap into more 
contemporary management theory concerned with the relational organisation as opposed to 
the output and intra-organisational focus of the NPM (ibid.). As Wooldridge et al (2019) 
note, the building and maintaining of stakeholder relationships are key factors in the 
successful development and implementation of a SIB.  
NPG incorporates a form of public service-dominant logic which recognises the distinctive 
context and nature of public, as compared to private, service and services. This is distinct 
from the ‘goods-dominant production logic of manufacturing and its linear Fordist models’ 
(Osborne 2018: 225) that underpins NPM and that Osborne argues is out of touch with an 
increasingly complex, fragmented and interdependent world (Osborne 2018). The public 
service-dominant logic articulated by Osborne’s Public Service Organisations ‘do not create 
value for citizens – they can only make a public service offering. It is how the citizen uses 
this offering and how it interacts with his/her own life experiences that creates value’ 
(Osborne 2018: 225). This understanding of how public service organisations create value 
places co-creation between the users of services and services at the heart of public service 
management and delivery (Bovaird 2007, Mazzei et al. 2019, Fox et al. 2019). Further, Rosen 
and Painter (2019) illustrate in their model of co-production, the objective citizen control or 
ownership is an evolving process, rather than a linear process that ends with the creation of a 
new service.  
The emphasis with NPG on a plural state, a mixed economy of public services and inter-
organisational governance structures seems to have some resonance with Social Impact 
Bonds where multiple players come together and new collaborations are a strong feature of 
this emerging sector (Gustafsson-Wright et al. 2015). However, SIBs as they are currently 
being developed and implemented do not fit neatly into the NPG paradigm. This is because 
the emphasis in NPG on co-created value shifts the focus of public management away from 
‘performance’ (however measured) towards value created by co-created relationships 
between services and the people who use them (Osborne 2018). It is the building of financial 
and contractual obligations that take priority in the specification of a SIB; the development of 
informal co-operative relationships, if it happens at all, is rather an externality than an 
outcome. 
Despite the reliance on relationship building in the success of SIBs (c.f. Wooldridge et al. 
2019), to date, there is little evidence of service users and communities being involved in the 
development of SIBs in either the UK, the US or worldwide (see for instance Ronicle et al. 
2014 and Gustafsson-Wright et al. 2015, two extensive reviews of SIBs, neither of which 
suggest service users or beneficiaries are significant stakeholders in the development of 
SIBs). This could of course suggest either that NPG theory does not fit perfectly with SIBs or 
that SIBs do not fit perfectly with the theory, an issue we will return to later in the paper.  
3. SIBs and innovation 
From the earliest work on SIBs, their potential to be a source of innovation has been a 
consistent narrative. Innovation could though take several forms. SIBs could be understood as 
an innovative form of financing social services and/or as encouraging innovative 
interventions to address social issues and/or as motivating interactions between stakeholders 
which may spark synergies and efficiencies (for example Moore et al. 2012). Early discussion 
of SIBs stressed only the former two modes of innovation. For example Social Finance 
(2009) in a discussion paper on SIBs argued both that SIBs were an innovation in financing 
social services and that the outcomes focus of SIBs would encourage social service providers 
to innovate. 
In practice, there is evidence of innovation in both finance and interventions resulting from 
the use of SIBs. In the UK some of the earliest SIBs were supported through a government 
Innovation Fund (Albertson et al. 2018). In the United States, the Social Innovation Fund 
within the Corporation for National and Community Service has supported the development 
of an ecosystem for SIBs. A survey of SIBs by Gustafsson-Wright et al. (2015) found that the 
most significant motivation for senior investors and intermediaries in SIBs was the 
opportunity to test an innovative financial model to address social problems. In the same 
survey actors also mentioned the opportunity to test innovative social interventions as a 
motivation for involvement in SIBs, although this motivation was less significant (ibid.).  
In this section we consider two broad approaches to thinking about innovation: open 
innovation and social innovation. 
Open Innovation 
Traditionally innovation was associated with something companies did through internal 
Research and Development (R&D) activities. In the post-industrial, information economy 
new models of innovation have become more influential. These start to break down the 
distinction between commercial and social innovation and suggest that innovation might 
involve collaboration between for-profit and not-for-profit organisations and users.  
The Open Innovation paradigm assumes that firms can and should use external ideas as well 
as internal ideas when they innovate because useful knowledge is abundant, widely 
distributed and generally of high quality (Chesbrough 2006). This focus on distributed 
innovation processes in which knowledge flows across organisational boundaries 
(Chesbrough and Bogers 2014) is in contrast to earlier models of innovation which assumed 
that useful knowledge is scarce, hard to find and hazardous to rely on (Chesbrough 2006). 
The implication of knowledge being widely distributed is that organisational boundaries 
become more permeable and firms must interact with a wide range of external actors, 
including users, customers, suppliers, universities, and competitors (Felin and Zenger 2014). 
Mechanisms for accessing external knowledge and fostering open innovation include contests 
and tournaments, alliances and joint ventures, corporate venture capital, licensing, open 
source platforms, and participation in various development communities (Felin and Zenger 
2014).  
Citing a number of previous studies, Felin and Zenger (2014) show there is evidence that an 
increase in the number of external linkages and breadth of search for useful knowledge can 
have beneficial outcomes for organisations striving to innovate. As the innovation process 
becomes more open intermediate markets arise in which parties can transact at stages that 
were previously conducted entirely within the firm. This leads to the rise of specialist firms 
that provide information, access and even financing to enable transactions to occur 
(Chesbrough 2006).  
Open Innovation 2.0 builds on the Open Innovation paradigm but places more emphasis on 
engagement between industry, government, universities and communities and users (the so-
called ‘quadruple helix’) to solve societal challenges sustainably and profitably (Curley 
2016). Open Innovation 2.0 requires the creation of ‘innovation ecosystems’ made up of a 
mixed economy of diverse actors who align their goals and collaborate to co-create ‘shared 
value’. This involves creating economic value in a way that also creates value for society by 
addressing its needs and challenges (Porter and Kramer 2011). It is possible to co-create 
shared value when companies shift from optimising short-term financial performance to 
optimising both corporate performance and social conditions, thus increasing the value shared 
by both the corporation and the society in which it is embedded (Porter and Kramer 2011).  
An interesting feature of Open Innovation 2.0 is that instead of the user or citizen being seen 
as a research object and innovation being done to the citizen, ‘the citizen and user becomes 
an integral part of the innovation process’ (Curley and Salmelin 2013) and user experience 
becomes a new driver for innovation. Innovation happens when a user becomes a co-creator 
of value – a concept similar to that described by Osborne (2018) above. For Curley (2016) 
this only happens when there are high levels of trust between collaborators and conviction in 
a shared vision. 
Curley (2016) suggests a number of components that are key to collaborative innovation. One 
is that solutions need to be tested and improved through rapid experimentation with users and 
citizens. This idea of ‘prototyping’ is just as applicable to services as it is to products and 
helps show how applicable a solution is, reduces the risks of failures and can reveal, what 
Curley refers to as ‘pain points’. Rapid experimentation to develop a solution might involve 
many different types of research depending upon the how developed the solution is and the 
precise evaluation question to be answered ranging from repeated randomised controlled 
trials (Haynes et al. 2012) to less formal, more iterative evaluation (Breckon 2015). It is an 
approach that requires a more benign attitude to risk and failure, better incentives (for 
example, rewards and competitions); new organisational structures (for example, innovation 
teams and crowd sourcing); and more open data (Breckon 2015).  
There are some overlaps between proponents’ aspirations of SIBs and open innovation. SIBs, 
it was argued, would align stakeholder interests around specific social outcomes. The long-
term vision was ambitious: 
Social Impact Bonds enable foundations, social sector organisations and government to work 
in new ways and to form new partnerships. By aligning the interests of all parties around 
common social outcomes, Social Impact Bonds have the potential to address some of 
society’s most intractable problems. (Social Finance 2009) 
Thus, it was argued, SIBs would unlock an untapped flow of social finance, creating an 
incentive to develop the evidence base for funded interventions and creating an incentive to 
develop innovative interventions and as a result of the increased focus on outcomes creating 
an ‘evidence incentive’ in which more and better evaluation would strengthen the knowledge 
base for social interventions (Social Finance 2009). This certainly resonates with elements of 
the Open Innovation model, particularly Open Innovation 2.0 and the quadruple helix. 
However, the fit is not perfect. 
To date, reviews of SIBs have generally found relatively little evidence of SIBs leading to the 
creation of innovative solutions to tackling social problems, although there is some evidence 
of existing services being provided in new contexts or to new population (see for instance 
Albertson et al. 2018, Gustafson-Wright et al. 2015 and Wooldridge et al. 2019). At a 
theoretical level it is also not clear that SIBs, understood as a form of open innovation, would 
be particularly well-suited to developing innovative solutions to complex social problems.  
The Open Innovation paradigm assumes that useful knowledge is abundant, widely 
distributed and generally of high quality and that distributed innovation processes will deliver 
more efficient solutions. The implication of knowledge being widely distributed is that 
organisations must interact with a wide range of external actors, including users, customers, 
suppliers, universities, and competitors using a range of governance models that include 
markets and contracts, partnerships and alliances, contests and platforms and users and 
communities (Felin and Zenger 2014). But SIBs do not make use of this full range of 
governance options and are essentially a set of contractual relationships between a limited 
number of players. Felin and Zenger (2014), invoke Arrow and Hahn’s (1971) ‘information 
paradox’ to argue that markets or contracts generally provide limited support for 
communication and knowledge exchange and are poor at supporting open, collaborative 
knowledge exchange. Instead market or contractual governance is ideally suited to solving 
simpler, well-structured problems that can be broken down into components that do not 
interact with each other and where each component of the problem can be solved 
independently. In contrast, complex problems have a large number of interdependent 
elements that require some kind of theory that guides the search for a solution and requires 
collaboration between diverse actors. Similarly, Sinclair et al. (2019) argue that: 
while SIBs may potentially be applicable to some technical policy interventions which 
address relatively simple conditions, they are inappropriate for the complex conditions 
characterising wicked social problems. 
On the contrary, SIBs are rather more suited, so it is argued, to simple problems where the 
‘outcome’ desired is relatively straightforwardly defined (ibid.).  
Social innovation 
In contrast to technological and industrial innovation, social innovation is explicitly about 
addressing human needs (Marques et al. 2018). However, to define social innovation simply 
in terms of providing social outcomes is misleading because many firms might claim that 
their innovations have important social impacts (Marques et al. 2018); for example a social 
media business or a dating website might be entirely profit driven, notwithstanding the 
products offered help tackle loneliness (ibid.). Social innovation, therefore also requires new 
processes which make use of social relations to deliver products and services in more 
efficient ways; more socially, not necessarily more economically, efficient.  
Although social innovation can refer to new products and services that address social needs – 
goal-oriented social innovation – (see for instance, Mulgan 2006; Phills et al. 2008) it also 
involves new processes which make use of social relations to deliver products and services in 
more efficient ways – process oriented social innovation (see for instance, Howaldt and 
Schwarz 2010; Mumford 2002). The combination of goal oriented and process oriented social 
innovation is captured in NESTA’s (Murray et al. 2010) simple, but effective definition is 
that social innovations are those innovations that are social in both their means and their ends. 
One of the defining features of social innovation is that it provides insights and develops 
capacity and soft infrastructure (intangible assets such as know-how, intellectual property, 
social capital etc.) that endure and can be utilised by other sectors and forms of innovation. 
Thus Mulgan et al. (2007: 35) note that “social innovations, unlike most technological ones, 
leave behind compelling new social relationships between previously separate individuals 
and groups”. In this sense social innovation provides a double benefit, not only can it help in 
finding solutions to pressing social needs, but the process of social innovation itself implies 
beneficial, transformative change, rather than mere incremental improvements in products 
and/or services (Didero et al. 2008).  
Nonetheless, in these terms social innovation is still a broad concept. Marques et al. (2018) 
suggest a more precise typology that distinguishes between: structural social innovation, 
which refers to wide social change in scale and scope; targeted radical social innovation 
where activities radically reshape how essential goods and services are delivered to improve 
welfare and challenge power relations; targeted complementary social innovation where new 
processes and relationships generate inclusive solutions to societal challenges; and, 
instrumental social innovation, entailing rebranding community development and corporate 
social responsibility in a way that is more appealing to stakeholders.  
If we start with the broad assertion that social innovations are social in both their means and 
ends then, on the face of it, SIBs are a promising fit to a social innovation framework. SIBs 
are innovations that are social in their ends and, in contrast to technological innovation, they 
are innovations that explicitly address key human needs. We can also start to locate SIBs 
within Marques et al.’s (2018) typology. First, while we might expect SIBs to fall primarily 
in one of the two ‘targeted social innovation’ categories, the large scale of some of the ‘scale-
up’ SIBs (Gustafsson-Wright et al. 2015) suggests that, actually, they might be considered as 
a form of structural social innovation. However, most SIBs seem to fit more comfortably into 
the category of ‘targeted social innovation’. Distinguishing between SIBS that engage in 
either radical or complementary versions of targeted social innovation is likely to be 
challenging. However, previous work in this field (for example, Albertson et al. 2018) 
suggests that SIBs are more likely to fall into the category of ‘targeted complementary social 
innovation’ where new processes and relationships generate inclusive solutions to societal 
challenges (Marques et al. 2018).  
However, using social innovation as the sole theoretical lense to understand SIBs also 
presents challenges. First, as noted above, beneficiaries (users of services funded by SIBs) 
and their communities generally have little or no role in the development of SIBs. Sinclair et 
al. (2019) argue that much of the support for SIBs is attributable to the fact that they appear 
to depoliticise social policy, although the application of narrowly conceived economic 
principles to welfare provision is a highly political decision. Sinclair et al. argue that SIBs 
represent a further step in the ongoing financialisation of social policy which transform 
service users into “fictitious commodities” (Sinclair et al. 2019: 4). But, one effect of this 
tendency has been the marginalisation of service users’ voice and agency (ibid).  
For Sinclair and colleagues (ibid.) transformational social innovations which may empower 
service users are more likely to result from a participatory approach to service design, 
implementation and evaluation. This is problematic for an application of social innovation 
theory to SIBs because it would suggest that, while SIBs are social in their ends, they are not 
fully social in their means. The means have social elements (63 percent of programs in the 
US and UK have at least one not-for-profit investor and over 87 percent of programs in the 
UK and US include a not-for-profit service provider), but ultimately SIBs tend not to include 
service users and communities in their development1.  
4. Discussion and conclusion 
None of the theories explored in this paper provide an explanatory framework into which 
SIBs fit neatly. This raises two possibilities if we are to determine whether and how SIBs are 
realising their theoretical potential: One is that more work is needed to develop a theoretical 
position that adequately explains SIBS; the other is that SIBs need to evolve to fit existing 
theory. 
Developing a theory to explain SIBs 
Open Innovation, particularly Open Innovation 2.0, with its stronger focus on addressing 
social challenges and recognition of the non-pecuniary motivations actors bring to the 
innovation process, provides a useful starting point for explaining SIBs. The use of Open 
Innovation models in this regard suggests a wider range of governance mechansisms is 
needed to solve complex social problems.  
Open Innovation 2.0 represents a convergence between ‘traditional’ innovation theory rooted 
in the behavior of private firms and the concept of ‘social’ innovation. Drawing on the 
concept of social innovation in order to explain SIBs makes sense because of its strong focus 
on social outcomes or ends. However, social innovation places equal weight on the 
importance of social means to achieve social ends, whereas the SIB model, which is 
essentially contractual leaves little room, in its current form for the kinds of service user and 
                                                 
1  Data are drawn from the Social Finance UK database through November 2018 
(https://sibdatabase.socialfinance.org.uk/) 
community involvement in developing SIBs that might be closer to the idea of facilitating an 
authentic social innovation process. 
The emerging paradigm of New Public Governance in public administration resonates with 
important elements of Open Innovation 2.0 and provides a potential framework both for 
placing SIBs within broader public service reform movements and for making clearer the 
relationship between social innovation and co-creation. Osborne (2018) suggests that the 
definition of what constitutes ‘value co-creation in public service is still only embryonic, but, 
he argues, the key is to move from linear and production-influenced conceptions of ‘co-
production’ to dynamic ‘value co-creation’. When we do so we find that public service 
organisations do not create value for citizens, rather they can only make a public service 
offering. Whether value is created depends on how citizens interact with it. Thus, co-creation 
assumes “an interactive and dynamic relationship where value is created at the nexus of 
interaction” (Osborne 2018: 225). Therefore, social and economic value for the service user 
and the public service organisation are not created by a linear process of production but rather 
through an interaction in which the service user’s wider life experience is part of the context 
(ibid.). This supports the findings of Wooldridge et al. (2019) who argue embedding a 
partnership approach by engaging all relevant stakeholders is key to the success of a SIB.  
What all this suggests is that while there is potential to develop richer theory to underpin 
SIBs by drawing on theories from several disciplines (Moore et al. 2012), there might also be 
a flaw in the design of SIBs: the lack of co-creation. This in turn suggests some elements of a 
future research strategy on SIBs, which as well as looking at the potential for SIBs to 
generate new funding for delivering social outcomes should examine how effective SIBs are 
at facilitating the process of social innovation including co-creation, piloting, and diffusion. 
The differences in the origin of SIBs in the UK, often spurred on by the public sector, and in 
the US, often initiated by third sector actors, suggests that multiple models may be 
appropriate to test in different contexts.  As such, some jurisdictions may be much more 
interested in public sector reform, while others may be interested in diffusing social 
innovation. 
The future development of SIBs 
For SIBs to be fully social in their means and ends future SIBs would need to incorporate a 
stronger element of co-creation. Co-creation can be understood as an integral part of the 
social innovation process (Murray et al. 2010). Voorberg et al. (2015) make a link between 
the co-creation and social innovation, describing them as ‘magic concepts’ that have been 
embraced as a new reform strategy for the public sector in the face of social challenges and 
budget austerity.   
There are different ways this might be achieved and it goes beyond the scope of this paper to 
develop detailed prescriptions. However, developing Social Investment Partnerships as 
suggested by Jupp (2017) might be one approach. Such partnerships might provide a more 
inclusive framework within which to accommodate user and community voices in co-creative 
processes. Other options might include developing SIBs with more experimentation built into 
their development process (see for example, Breckon 2015); SIBs which tackle more 
complex social outcomes (for example, the Reconnections SIB in the UK that is tackling 
loneliness, see Jupp 2017); or SIBs where interventions are explicitly designed to promote 
asset or strengths-based approaches (what Wilson et al. 2018 term ‘good help’). More radical 
possibilities include the possibility of crowdsourcing funds to democratise the investment 
side of the SIB or micro-financing interventions – both mechanisms that might start to make 
co-creation a reality within SIBs. 
More for less 
Few would argue with the need to do more – to create more social output – with less 
resources cost. The question is how this might be done. Governments have an unfortunate 
history of rather doing less with more – particularly when innovation is not well theorised 
(King and Crewe 2014). Yet the for-profit private sector on its own is not, by definition, 
motivated to pursue the goal of more social output, if it means less profit. 
Our overview of the theory which might support SIBs indicates we ought not to start with 
what can be done, but rather to consider what needs to be done – and this will involve co-
creation, co-innovation, with (potential) service users. Our current analysis indicates we must 
focus more on where a Social Impact Bond (literally) begins; with the Social. 
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